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The learning of one man does not subtract from the learning of another, 
as if there were to be a limited quantity to be divided into exclusive 
holdings. . . . That which one man gains by discovery is a gain to other 
men. And these multiple gains become invested capital. . . .  
John Wesley Powell, 1886    
 
ABSTRACT. The restructuring of state education systems in many OECD countries 
during the last two decades has involved a significant shift away from an emphasis 
on administration and policy to an emphasis on management.  The “new manager- 
ialism” has drawn theoretically, on the one hand, on the model of corporate manager- 
ialism and private sector management styles, and, on public choice theory and new 
institutional economics (NIE), most notably, agency theory and transaction cost 
analysis, on the other.  A specific constellation of these theories is sometimes called 
“New Public Management,” which has been very influential in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These theories and models have been used 
both as the legitimation for policies that redesigning state educational bureaucracies, 
educational institutions and even the public policy process. Most importantly, there 
has been a decentralization of management control away from the center to the 
individual institution through a “new contractualism” – often referred to as the 
“doctrine of self-management” – coupled with new accountability and competitive 
funding regimes. This shift has often been accompanied by a disaggregation of 
large state bureaucracies into autonomous agencies, a clarification of organizational 
objectives, and a separation between policy advice and policy implementation func- 
tions, together with a privatization of service and support functions through “contract- 
ing out”.  The “new managerialism” has also involved a shift from input controls to 
quantifiable output measures and performance targets, along with an emphasis on 
short-term performance contracts, especially for CEOs and senior managers.  In the 
interests of so-called “productive efficiency,” the provision of educational services 
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has been made contestable; and, in the interests of so-called allocative efficiency 
state education has been progressively marketized and privatized. In this paper I 
analyze the main underlying elements of this theoretical development that led to the 
establishment of the neoliberal university in the 1980s and 1990s before entertain- 
ing and reviewing claims that new public management is dead. At the end of the 
paper I focus on proposals for new forms of “the public” in higher education as a 
means of promoting “radical openness” consonant with the development of Web 
2.0 technologies and new research infrastructures in the global knowledge economy.  
 
Keywords: New Managerialism, New Public Management (NPM), performance cul- 
                  ture, contractualism, self-management, decentralization, contracting-out 
 
1. Introduction  
 
After Nietzsche, the philosophical critique of the Western university has 
developed along two interrelated lines: the first, pursued by Weber and con- 
tinued by Heidegger, Jaspers, Lyotard and Bourdieu emphasized the dangers 
of economic interest vested in the university through the dominance of 
technical reason; the second, initiated by members of the Frankfurt School 
and developed differently by Foucault, traces the imprint and controlling in- 
fluence of the state in the academy through the apparatus of administrative 
reason. With the rise of the “neoliberal university” these two forms of 
reason have come together in a new constellation. First, through a capit- 
ulation of the norms of liberal humanism and the Kantian ethical subject 
the university has embraced the main articles of faith underlying the 
revitalization of economic rationalism and introduced the principle of homo 
economicus into university governance. Second, through the imposition of 
structural adjustments policies of the IMF based on the “Washington con- 
sensus” universities in the developing world during the 1980s were forced 
to privatize universities with devastating impacts.  
Neoliberal universities, with little philosophical self-reflection, have been 
put in the service of the “new global economy” under conditions of knowl- 
edge capitalism that has had several effects.1 First, it has diminished the 
public status of the university. In the era of sovereign debt crisis the search 
for alternative funding patterns have led to national strategies for encourag- 
ing fee-paying students on the basis of human capital theory, leading to 
excessive student debt and a consequent privatization of higher education. 
Second, it has buttressed domestic fee-paying students with an international- 
ization of higher education and the global competition for international 
students with the growth of multiple campuses and off-shore profit centers. 
Both these features led directly to the encouragement of all forms of capi- 
talization of the self and a kind of new educational prudentialism (Peters, 
 13 
2005). Third, it has focused on issues of intellectual capital and the own- 
ership of the means of knowledge production with the development and 
expansion of research parks, private-public partnerships in science produc- 
tion, and an emphasis on the commercialization of research and online 
teaching initiatives. Fourth, it has led to the huge growth of administration 
vis-à-vis the teaching and research faculty, to an increasing bureaucratization 
of the university and to the emergence of a new class of “knowledge 
managers,” – an administrative cadre – whose job is monitor and measure 
academic performance and to maximize returns from research.   
Most of these developments leading to the neoliberal university and its 
recent variants – the “entrepreneurial university,” the “enterprise university,” 
the “innovation university” – spring from the application of neoliberal 
economics to higher education based on a series of reforms carried out in 
the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, the reforms often collectively referred 
to as “new managerialism” or “new public management,” often applied to 
the reform of the public sector as a whole, have sprung from public choice 
theory and new institutional economics leading to a fundamental reframing 
of the university what Bill Readings has called “the university of excellence.” 
The vice-chancellor, deans and heads of department have increasingly become 
“knowledge managers” in a knowledge corporation charged with running 
the university through a strategic planning process in accordance with 
targets, new incentive structures, and policy directives at the expense of 
traditional collegial and democratic governance. Governing councils have 
become corporate boards further sidelining academic forums. There is a new 
emphasis on executive-directed systems for internal university consultation 
and communication, from internal market research to vice-chancellors’ ad- 
visory groups with the consequent decline of collegiality forums and faculty 
input into key governance decisions. The rise of new property structures 
concerning international education, intellectual property, relations with in- 
dustry, and work-based training have thickened the relationship to industry 
without any compensating collegial structures. Research management is in- 
creasingly subject to the new discipline of performance system assessment 
as institutions gear up to deliver research outputs and competing for fund- 
ing within increasingly sophisticated national funding output-driven perfor- 
mance systems. This has led to a diminishment of the role of peer input 
into decisions about research and the prioritization of research in terms of 
quantity of research income rather than in terms of numbers of publications 
produced or in terms of quality of scholarship (Marginson, 1999). 
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2. Theoretical Elements of the “New Managerialism” 
 
1. Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory applies the methods of economics to the study of 
political and administrative behavior. It originated with Gordon Tullock 
(editor of Public Choice) and James Buchanan, formerly of Virginia Poly- 
technic Institute and State University and now located at George Mason 
University at Virginia. The essence of public choice theory has been 
summed up by Buchanan (1980: 19–27) who identifies its two elements as 
the “catallactics” approach to economics (or “catallaxy” as Hayek terms it) 
and the classical homo economicus postulate concerning individual behavior 
normally interpreted in terms of three attributes: rationality, individuality 
and self-interest. Individuals are conceived as “rational utility-maximizers.” 
“Catallactics” is the study of institutions of exchange which Buchanan deems 
the proper object of research and inquiry in economics. It allegedly rests on 
the principle of “spontaneous order” most thoroughly developed in the 
work of Hayek who argues that unhampered markets, without government 
control or intervention, demonstrate a tendency to equilibrium. In Hayek’s 
thought the spontaneous order conception applies to physical systems (for 
example, crystals and galaxies) as much as to social and cultural life (for 
example, the growth of language; the development of law and the emergence 
of social norms). We can distinguish three elements of the idea of spon- 
taneous social order in Hayek’s work: 
• The invisible hand thesis that social institutions arise as a result of human 
action but not from human design; 
• The thesis of the primacy of tacit or practical knowledge – a thesis which 
maintains that knowledge of the social world is embodied in practices and 
skills and only secondarily in theories; 
• The thesis of the natural selection of competitive traditions in which “tra- 
ditions” are “understood to refer to complexes of practices and rules of 
action and perception and the claim is that there is a continuous evolu- 
tionary filtering of these traditions” (Gray, 1984: 33-34).  
 
It is ultimately on the basis of this argument, originating in a critique of 
Cartesian rationalism that Hayek (distinct from Buchanan) claims that we 
must give up the modern ideal of an interventionist public policy and re- 
place it with an ideal of cultivating general conditions within which benefits 
might be expected to emerge. 
The main innovation of Buchanan and the public choice school is to 
apply this notion of spontaneous order conception beyond simple exchange 
(two commodities/two persons) to complex exchange and finally to all pro- 
cesses of voluntary agreement among persons. Buchanan (1986: 20) writes: 
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“By a more or less natural extension of the catallactic approach, economists 
can look on politics and on political action in terms of the exchange 
paradigm.” It is important to realize that this is the case so long as col- 
lective action is modeled with individual decision-makers as the basic units. 
The result of this conception is to confine politics to the realm of non-
voluntary relationships among persons – that is, those relationships involving 
power or coercion. Normative implications are derived from public choice 
theory and carry with them an approach to institutional reform. To the 
extent that voluntary exchange is valued positively while coercion is valued 
negatively, public choice theorists favor market-like arrangements and/or 
the decentralization of political authority. The constitutional perspective is 
said to emerge naturally from the politics-as-exchange paradigm: “To improve 
politics it is necessary to improve or reform the rules, the framework within 
which the game is played … A game is described by its rules, and a better 
game is produced only by changing the rules” (Buchanan, 1986: 22). 
Buchanan (1986), following Wicksell (the Swedish economist and claimed 
precursor of public choice theory), states that if reform in economic policy 
is desired then we should look to the rules through which economic policy 
decisions get made, that is, look to the constitution itself. This conception has 
revolutionized “public choice” and provided a strong rationale and approach 
to the reform of the public sector. The second element of public choice 
theory is the behavioral postulate known as homo economicus, that is the 
modern “rediscovery” of the main tenet of classical liberal economics, that 
people should be treated as “rational utility-maximizers” in all of their 
behavior. In other words, individuals are modeled as seeking to further 
their own interests (defined in terms of measured net wealth positions) in 
politics as in other aspects of their behavior. 
 
2. New Institutional Economics 
Managerialism is a new form of governance based on constitutional or 
rule-making activity. As Davis (1997: 228) suggests the “new institutional 
economics encouraged policy-makers to see public services not as pro- 
duction functions or firms, but as governance structures.” Institutional 
economics abandons the traditional notion of a firm as being a production 
function to see it as a governance structure that reduces transaction costs 
and market competition favors the governance structure with the most 
efficient solutions of the problems of transaction costs. The notion of 
economic efficiency in institutional economics has successful shifted ethos 
and practice of management to a question of the culture and structure of 
governance based on the value of customizing the service or product. 
Neoliberalism is the substantive discourse of governance that is potent 
precisely because of is its capacity to combine economics, the social, and 
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politics on behalf of rational choice as a principle of legitimacy. Gover- 
nance arrangements have been classified into simple purchase and sale 
arrangements, bilateral arrangements for more complex relationships as for 
example, with joint ventures, trilateral arrangements where third parties are 
involved in processes such as arbitration and vertically integration where 
the transaction costs are reduced by forming a firm. While the institutional 
analysis of the public sector (for example, selecting governance structures 
which minimize transaction costs) is fundamentally concerned with the 
same issues as in the private sector, the actual issues and concepts of the 
public sector are different from the private sector for whereas in the private 
sector firms may fail, the same cannot be allowed for government structures 
even under marketized conditions.  
  The new institutional economics embraces at least two different strands 
of thought: agency theory and transaction cost analysis. Agency theory 
focuses on the problem of how to get agents to do what their principals want 
through contracts. While managerialism did not necessarily imply a move 
to contracting in the public sector, but it laid all the necessary foundations.  
Transaction cost analysis is concerned with concepts and principles for 
analyzing and controlling transactions though, for example, transparency, 
goals specification, clear allocation of decision rights, incentives, contracts 
and the credibility of commitments. Transaction costs are seen as the economic 
equivalent of friction in physical systems and transaction cost analysis is 
concerned with an examination of the comparative costs of planning, adapt- 
ing and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures.  
As the context for business changed difficulties in transacting business 
ensued whereupon attempts were made at designing new governance systems 
that would minimize the costs of such transactions.   
We can also distinguish the old collectivist notion of the social contract 
from a “new contractualism” that represents a neoliberal politicization of 
public management. No longer are citizens presumed to be members of a 
political community that it is the business of a particular form of gover- 
nance to express. The old presumed shared political process of the social 
contract disappears in favor of a disaggregated and individualized relation- 
ship to governance. Although contract can be regarded as a source of 
legitimacy – on the basis of the social contract – the idea of contract as an 
instrument of government can also be invoked. While contract theory is com- 
monly regarded as addressing questions of the legitimacy of government, it 
can be seen as the core of an autonomous rationality of government on 
three counts: first, it specifies the population to be governed as “autono- 
mous” citizens; second, it identifies a rationality of government that depends 
on no external principles; third, it tells us that individuals are to be gov- 
erned on the basis of the presumed social contract. 
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3. New Public Management 
During the 1980s and ‘90s a particular form of managerialism referred as 
New Public Management (NPM) (Boston, 1996; Boston, et al., 1996; Hood, 
1990, 1991, 1992; Aucoin, 1988, 1990a, 1990b; Peters, 1990) or simply as 
public management (Pollitt, 1990: 156) came to dominate policy agendas.  
Pollitt (1992: 11) notes that the managerial literature contains little reference 
to the welfare state or the characteristic modes of thought of its policy- 
makers, administrators and service providers. He notes that social needs, 
professional standards, deprivation, community and equity have historically 
played little or no part in the development of managerialism and writes: 
“the transfer, during the last decade or two, of managerialism from private 
sector corporations to welfare-state services represents the injection of an 
ideological ‘foreign body’ into a sector previously characterized by quite 
different traditions of thought” (Pollitt, 1992: 11). 
Private sector management theory – notably the work of Drucker – had 
an influence on new public management outside economic theory.  There is 
an extensive literature on strategic management and management by objec- 
tives which predate the new institutional economics but which arrive at 
similar conclusions about clear goals and reporting relationships. The em- 
phasis, for example, on contracting could emerge from business management 
theory or public administration theory as no more than a useful technique 
to introduce clarity, transparency and competition into organization. Some 
scholars argue that the notion of public management does not differ sub- 
stantially from private management (e.g., Martin, 1994).  
      The key features of new public management as developed in New 
Zealand as perhaps the most comprehensive model have been identified by 
Boston and his colleagues (1996: 4–5) as comprising three separate aspects: 
the broad objectives; the administrative principles; and the specific policies. 
In specific policy terms, the model developed in the mid 1990s exhibited 
the following features: 
 1. A preference for retaining key governmental powers and responsi- 
bilities at the central government level with only limited devolution to sub-
national government despite considerable rhetoric about devolution in the 
1980s. 
 2. A strong emphasis on the use of incentives to enhance performance, 
at both the institutional and the individual level (e.g., short term employ- 
ment contracts, performance-based remuneration systems, promotion sys- 
tems, etc.). 
 3. An extensive use of explicit, generally written “contracts” of various 
kinds, which specify the nature of performance required and the respective 
obligations of agents and principals (e.g., performance agreements between 
ministers and department CEs, purchase agreements between ministers and 
 18 
departments, and contracts between funders and purchasers and between 
purchasers and providers). In addition to the emphasis on ex ante per- 
formance specification, more exacting monitoring and reporting systems 
have been introduced. 
 4. The development of an integrated and relatively sophisticated strategic 
planning and performance management system throughout the public sector. 
Key elements include the specification by ministers of strategic result areas 
and key result areas and the integration of these into CEs’ performance 
agreements and departmental purchase agreements. 
 5. The removal, wherever possible, of dual or multiple accountability 
relationships within the public sector, and the avoidance of joint central and 
local democratic control of public services 
 6. The institutional separation of commercial and non-commercial func- 
tions; the separation of advisory, delivery, and regulatory functions; and the 
related separation of the roles of funder, purchaser, and provider 
 7. The maximum decentralisation of production and management decision-
making, especially with respect to the selection and purchase of inputs and 
the management of human resources 
 8. The implementation of a financial management system based on accrual 
accounting and including capital charging, a distinction between the Crown’s 
ownership and purchaser interests, a distinction between outcomes and 
outputs, an accrual-based appropriations system, and legislation requiring 
economic policies that are deemed to be “fiscally responsible.” 
 9. Strong encouragement for, and extensive use of, competitive tendering 
and contracting out, but few mandatory requirements for market testing or 
competitive tendering (Boston et al., 1996: 4–5). 
 
NPM has gained political acceptance in at least three different countries: 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. He says all of these three 
variants of NPM share some general features. They include the switch in 
emphasis from policy formulation to management and institutional design; 
a shift from process controls to output controls; a move from integration to 
differentiation and from statism to subsidiarity. Hood (1990) then gives 
five possible explanations for the rise of NPM in the late 1980s: First, NPM 
could be simply interpreted as a “mood swing” or passing fad. Second, NPM 
could be interpreted as a “new-look form of Treasury control with a set of 
doctrines fastened upon the financial by central controlling agencies to 
destroy the administrative bases of the public welfare lobby and to increase 
their own power vis-à-vis the professionalized line departments” (Hood, 
1990: 206). Third, “parts of NPM could be seen as reflecting a new political 
campaign technology – the shift to public policy based on intensive opinion 
polling which is part of the new machine politics style” (Hood, 1990: 206).  
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Fourth, NPM could reflect a “new client politics,” the advent of a new easily 
mobilizable coalition whose collective self-interest drives a policy boom.  
This is sometimes referred to as the development of the new elite aiming at 
increasing their own powers of patronage and consisting of management 
consultants, financial intermediaries, insurance companies, and other groups 
that have a clear interest in privatization and contracting out. It is these 
people who give policy advice to government on what the rationality of 
government should be. Fifth, NPM could be interpreted as an administrative 
reflection of that broader set of social changes triggered by “post indus- 
trialism” or “post Fordism.” Of the five possible explanations of the rise of 
NPM, the fifth is, according to Hood (1990: 207), this is the most complete. 
   Hood (1990: 214) considered that the NPM is not sufficiently theorized 
and concludes with a discussion about four possible areas of concern. The 
first concerns the change in public service ethics, loyalty to the service as a 
whole and resilience to political crisis: political accountability involves much 
more than achieving “one line” results. The second concerns the problem 
of how to reconcile the Taylorist and “new institutional economics” wings 
of NPM. Public choice has an inherently decentralist, consumer oriented 
bias, whereas the new Taylorism is about manipulation from above or from 
a controlling authority. The third concern is about the limits of the NPM 
revolution. There seems to be no end to the individualizing and atomization 
process. Hood refers to the possibility of selling government administrative 
positions so that the purchaser could then invest in the successful discharge 
of their duties. The fourth concern is the problem of exactly what kind of 
public service the NPM revolution is aiming to produce. Should the really 
high salaries go to the public sector or to the so-called private “wealth 
producing” sector? In the latter case, how then could the public sector 
attract the necessary talent? – or would it be then structured to produce the 
very mediocre performance that it was so criticized for in the past?  
Pollitt (1990: 25) draws attention to a recently emerging analysis that sets 
limits on the practical usefulness that managers can derive form any general 
theory of management. This failure is attributed to the idea that managerial 
skills differ considerably from other sorts of expertise in their limited stan- 
dardization across industries, their susceptibility to change, their specificity 
to situations rather than problems and their diffuse, varied knowledge base. 
Effective management will require more than mere knowledge of manage- 
ment theory.  This suggests that to the extent that we see the same model of 
management spread across all situations in the pubic sector, it will be 
appropriate to ask how realistic this is in terms of the very different require- 
ments between the various public areas.   
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3. “New Public Management Is Dead” 
 
New public management is a management philosophy used by governments 
to modernize and restructure the public sector based on the hypothesis that 
a more market orientation in the public sector will lead to greater cost-
efficiency for governments, without negative side effects. Often the neo- 
liberal restructuring reforms across the public sector with an emphasis on 
public health and the universities as two of the largest government port- 
folios focused on introducing competition in to the public sector through 
consumer-driven systems (citizens as shareholders), with strong attention 
to better management of the public budgetary process and a new accent on 
leadership. 
By the end of 1990s commentators were heralding the end of public 
choice and new public management with a resurgence of institutional theories 
based on March and Olsen’s (1984) famous paper. B. Guy Peters (2000) 
writes: 
 
The past decade and a half have seen a major reassertion of 
institutional theories in the social sciences, and especially in 
political science. The March and Olsen (1984) article in the 
APSR was the beginning of the revolution against the method- 
ological individualism of both behavioralism and rational choice 
approaches. Following from that and their subsequent publications 
(1989; 1994; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Olsen and Peters, 
1996) there has been a proliferation of institutional theories and 
applications of those theories. Similarly, in economics (North, 
1990; Alston, Eggerston and North, 1996; Khalil, 1995) and in 
sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1987) 
there has been a birth (or more appropriately a resurrection) of 
institutional approaches to the basic questions in these disciplines. 
 
A number of critics proclaim that NPM is “dead” and argue that the cutting 
edge of change has moved on to digital era governance (DEG) focusing on 
reintegrating concerns into government control, holistic (or joined-up) gov- 
ernment and digitalization. DEG draws on principles of open government 
and utilizes the Web and digital storage to focus on transparency and better 
communication within government. For instance, Dunleavy and Margetts 
(2006) argue that NPM has stalled or been reversed because its complexity 
has reduced the capacity of citizens and public stakeholders to participate 
in the solution of social problems. They claim that next wave of tech- 
nology-centered change is shifting toward “digital-era governance” (DEG), 
which involves reintegrating functions into the governmental sphere, adopt- 
ing holistic and needs-oriented structures, and progressing digitalization of 
administrative processes.  
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Others associated with Public Value theory have re-asserted a focus on 
citizenship, networked governance and the role of public agencies in work- 
ing with citizens to co-create public value, generate democratic authorization, 
and foster legitimacy and trust. They stress that the domains within which 
public managers are working as complex adaptive systems with charac- 
teristics that are qualitatively different from simple market forms, or private 
sector business principles (Moore, 1995; Cole & Parston, 2006; Cresswell 
et al., 2006). 
In 2001 the European Commission wrote a white paper on governance 
entitled European Governance which begins with the following statement:2 
 
Democratic institutions and the representatives of the people, at 
both national and European levels, can and must try to connect 
Europe with its citizens. This is the starting condition for more 
effective and relevant policies. 
 
And continues 
 
The White Paper proposes opening up the policy-making process 
to get more people and organizations involved in shaping and 
delivering EU policy. It promotes greater openness, account- 
ability and responsibility for all those involved. 
 
The white paper proposes a change to “better involvement and openness” 
based on online information in the preparation of policy, more systematic 
dialogue with all constituencies, greater flexibility to accommodate local 
diversity, and the encouragement of partnership arrangements. The white 
paper also promotes “better policies, regulation and delivery,” “global gov- 
ernance” and “refocused institutions.” 
 
4. Radical Openness and the Idea of the University 
 
Ron Barnett (2011: 3) is one author who has recognized the evolution of 
new institutional forms in higher education under conditions of neoliberal 
knowledge capitalism that tend toward the “hyper-modernisation” of the 
university. He writes: 
 
New institutional forms involving cross-institutional collaboration, 
a blurring of the public and the private, new learning modes 
(especially favouring e-learning and practice-based learning), 
forms of knowledge pursued for their ‘impact’ on the knowl- 
edge economy, the rise of the ‘global’ in higher education and 
the emergence of ‘nomadic’ identities among academics: all 
these and more contribute to the ‘hyper-modernisation’ of the 
university (cf. Lipovetsky, 2005). 
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He comments on the shift towards “performativity”, the accent on so-called 
“useful knowledge” with direct applicability in society and “a slide away 
from “liberal education” towards vocationalisation and the increasing in- 
fluence of governments and inter-governmental agencies in encouraging 
these shifts” (pp. 4–5).  
The 2008 global financial crisis was the consequence of the processes 
of both “financialization” and the hegemonic neoliberal ideology based on 
self-regulated and efficient markets. Neoclassical economics has played the 
role of a meta-ideology as it legitimized, mathematically and “scientifically,” 
neoliberal ideology and deregulation (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). There is hope 
that from this crisis a new democratic capitalist system will emerge with 
tendencies toward a global and knowledge-economy based on an improved 
democracy that is more open, social and genuinely participative. 
New forms of technological-enabled openness, especially emergent social 
media that utilizes social networking, blogs, wikis and user-created content 
and media, provide new models of openness for a conception of the intel- 
lectual commons based on peer production which is a radically decentralized, 
genuinely interactive, and collaborative form of knowledge sharing that can 
usefully serve as the basis of “knowledge cultures” (Peters & Besley, 2006; 
Peters & Roberts, 2011). The modern university was based on the prin- 
ciples of industrial broadcast mass media that was designed to reach large 
audience on a one-to-many logic. The open university is based on the new 
P2P architectures and technologies that are part of the ideology of Web 2.0 
and given expression in ways that emphasize the ethic of participation 
(“participatory media”), collaboration and file-sharing characterizing the 
rise of social media (see Peters et al, 2011).  
The modern university was an institution built on the principles of in- 
dustrial media; the open university is an institution built upon the principles 
of social media providing the basis for a new social media model of the 
university that embraces the social democratic vision of the university and 
that it provides, first, the means to recover and enhance the historical 
mission of the university (Peters, 2007) and, second, a useful discourse to 
re-theorize the university in the twenty-first century, jettisoning its neo- 
liberal managerialist ideology and returning to a fully socialized view of 
knowledge and knowledge-sharing that has its roots in Enlightenment think- 
ing about science and its new practices in commons-based peer-production.   
The university model of open management builds on both digital-era 
governance and the notion of public value and links effectively with moves 
to rebuild new forms of the public through principles of open governance. 
It is linked to the rejuvenation of open-source governance as a political 
theory that harnesses open source and open-content movements to demo- 
cratic principles to promote collaborative and deliberative forms of open 
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management characterized by the centrality of historic structures of peer 
review and peer governance. If the capacity to create knowledge – or what 
Italian autonomists call the “general intellect” – is becoming the key 
productive force, arguably there is a need for a full-blown social form of 
knowledge management (Peters & Bulut, 2011; Peters & Reveley, 2012). 
In the age of knowledge capitalism, we can expect governments in the 
West to further ease themselves out of the public provision of education as 
they begin in earnest to privatize the means of knowledge production and 
experiment with new ways of designing and promoting a permeable inter- 
face between knowledge businesses and public education at all levels. In 
the last two decades we have witnessed the effects of the Hayekian revo- 
lution in the economics of knowledge and information, we have experienced 
the attack on “big government” and reductions of state provision, funding 
and regulation. In the age of knowledge capitalism the next great struggle 
after the “culture wars” and the “science wars” of the 1990s will be the 
“education wars,” a struggle not only over the meaning and value of knowl- 
edge both internationally and locally, but also over the public means of 
knowledge production.  
The problem of the accumulation of knowledge – a new accumulation 
regime at the very heart of knowledge capitalism – is a complex layered 
system comprised on at least three components: the content layer; the code 
layer; and the infrastructure layer. Where content can be open and free, code 
and infrastructure is generally owned. This is the essence of “algorithmic 
knowledge capitalism” (Peters, 2011) and clearly evident in the development 
of a cybernetic informational capitalism and the recent emergence of the 
giant info-utilities like Google, Amazon.com and Microsoft. 
The learned society provides a model that is neither state nor market 
that has a long history of a commitment to public knowledge and science 
based on peer review and governance as an essential characteristic of 
science and scholarship, along with replicability, testability and the cultivation 
of a critical attitude that is the essence of peer review. Learned societies 
also provide a useful set of norms upon which to generalize and establish 
the learning society as a generalized science model committed to the public 
good. In the digital age new Web 2.0 technologies and forms of social media 
provide new ways of enhancing and building upon the peer production of 
knowledge. The Internet has become the foundational cyberinfrastructure 
that facilitates scholarly communication and deep data-sharing, archiving and 
publishing affecting every stage of the scholarly production, transforming 
the historical concepts that historically comprised the legal and economic 
architecture that grew up around intellectual property rights and the emer- 
gence of the concept of the public in its modern sense. Mass digitization of 
books, electronic books and new forms of open journals systems have greatly 
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expanded the availability of scholarly publication and scientific data chang- 
ing both the logics of production and consumption (reception) of academic 
texts. New models of open science and open knowledge production based 
on principles of global public goods and an ethos of sharing and collab- 
oration create new transnational academic communities in global knowledge 
ecologies that intersect in novel ways. Now is the time to experiment with 
and institute new university models of open management that recognize the 
vital role of the public university and its role in the production of knowl- 
edge and citizens for knowledge democracies.  
 
NOTES 
 
1. On higher education and the forms of the knowledge economy, see Peters & 
Besley (2006), Peters (2007), Murphy, Peters & Marginson (2010), Marginson, 
Murphy & Peters (2010), Araya & Peters (2010), Peters (2010), Peters & Bulut 
(2011), Peters & Reveley (2012). 
2. See the governance website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_ 
en.htm. 
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